Abstract: For overcoming the Great Recession, the EU has opted for a strategy that combines austerity-driven fiscal and experimental 'growth enhancing' research, development and innovation (RDI) policies supported by different policy coordination mechanisms. We analyse the experiences of four Central and Eastern European economies -Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia -in implementing this strategy. Given the weak policy capacities both in the EU institutions and CEE economies to draft and coordinate such novel and experimental RDI policies, we find that the implementation of this strategy is more complicated under the current EU fiscal and economic policy coordination system than assumed by the EU.
Introduction
The Great Recession has laid bare the major institutional deficiencies of the EU: a monetary union without a fiscal and full political union. The search for short-term and long-term institutional solutions to these deficiencies -from European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to Two and Six Packs -have set in motion deeper political and economic integration of the EU and a policy choice to pursue austerity as the key exit strategy (Mody 2015) supported by related structural reforms in e.g. labour markets and pension systems. Given the lessthan-expected success of this strategy, the EU (EC 2014a) has sought to balance austerity with 'growth enhancing' strategies by recommending member states also to 'sustain and where possible promote growth enhancing expenditures within overall fiscal consolidation efforts' (p. 2), and to regard research and development and innovation (RDI) investments as sources of renewed growth, and to coordinate fiscal and economic policies accordingly. At the same time, Veugelers (2014) has shown that since the Great Recession, innovation-lagging and fiscally weak countries have cut their public RDI funding while innovation-leading and fiscally stronger economies have increased expenditures. In other words, shorter-term fiscal policy concerns have dominated and also influenced longer-term RDI policy choices.
In this paper, we are interested in how the proposed growth enhancing strategy has evolved in the newer member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since the EU's increased attempts at policy coordination. Reinert and Kattel (2014; also Pula 2014) argue that the logic of CEE integration to the EU has from the beginning suffered from structural contradictions leading to integrative yet asymmetrical integration (i.e. attempts to integrate countries at different levels of economic development into a welfare state), or even to welfare colonialism whereby deindustrialisation and erosion of productive factors in the peripheral economies has been paralleled by increasing welfare transfers via the EU cohesion policy funds and remittances. The accession obligation to adopt Euro and the growing dependence on the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) for financing economic restructuring policies have meant that CEE economies have acted as rule takers (Bruszt and McDermott 2012) even after the formal accession. In this context, pressures for policy convergence around specific European 'best practices', regardless of domestic situations and needs, have been present both in fiscal policy (through the Maastricht criteria, Stability and Growth Pact) and in RDI policies. The extensive convergence in the content and governance of RDI policies has been driven by the softer Lisbon Agenda based open method of coordination and the conditionalities of cohesion policies (Karo and Kattel 2010; Suurna and Kattel 2010; Izsak et al. 2014 ).
In most analyses, these potential pressures towards de-contextualised convergence remain hidden as the EU -as a transnational integration regime (Bruszt and McDermott 2012) -formally prioritises (ever since the Werner report in 1969) institutional and capacity building and contextual adaptation of EU-wide rules as prerequisites for integration.
We argue that, given its institutional imperfections, the EU's initiatives for improved fiscal and RDI policy have not provided a new impetus for overcoming such tendencies for de-contextualised convergence. On the one hand, based on the lessons from the Lisbon Agenda based RDI policies, it has been generally agreed that more effective RDI policies require a shift from providing generic 'framework conditions' for innovation (through general funding of RDI and supporting networking between businesses and academia) towards more focused, contextualised and in many cases also regionalised RDI policy approaches by allowing greater policy experimentation by member states and regions. In the EU, this approach has been labelled as 'smart specialisation' (Foray 2014) , but the operationalisation of this concept is still ongoing (Foray et al. 2011; McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2015) . On the other hand, austerity driven fiscal consolidation strategies seem to lead towards centralisation of fiscal policies and as a result also general policy coordination both in member states (Raudla et al. 2015) and in the EU institutions (Goetz and Patz 2016). As a result, the institutional arenas of RDI policy are becoming more complex as both the EU and member state level institutions of fiscal and economic policy coordination become more interested and involved in RDI policies. Coordination across policy domains seems highly challenging in a context where specific RDI policy rationales and related policy and country-specific competencies to guide different economies are only emergent both in the EU institutions of economic and fiscal policy coordination (Savage and Verdun 2016) and in member states most affected by such coordination initiatives (Karo and Kattel 2015; . We conjecture that as these characteristics are making RDI policy arenas more complex and uncertain, the more straightforward fiscal rules and existing policy and administrative routines of RDI policies inherited from the Lisbon Agenda era continue to drive policy processes and limit policy space for contextual and experimental RDI policy making.
In the next section we provide a brief overview of the evolution fiscal and RDI policy coordination in the EU. Thereafter, we analyse how four CEE economies have responded to the Great Recession and the EU initiatives to coordinate fiscal and RDI policies in a growth enhancing manner. We focus on four relatively successful CEE countries -the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia -that formally prioritise RDI-based economic development, but represent different traditions of capitalism.
The sources of data for our analysis included …. The concluding section summarises and discusses the broader implications of our analysis.
Fiscal and RDI policy coordination in the EU
Without going into the details about the flaws in the architecture of the EU and the Eurozone, the last 10 years of economic and fiscal policy coordination in the EU show significant inconsistencies. Overall, this process has been characterised by growing integration while resisting further supranationalism (Bickerton et al. 2014) leading to what Habermas (2012) has labelled executive federalism, i.e. integration taken further by intergovernmental agreements and institutional solutions. Savage and Verdun (2016) show that through the search for institutional solutions to the Great Recession and for improved fiscal and economic policy coordination, the European Commission (EC) has found a new role of pro-active policy coordination. For such a role, the creation of new policy capacities and adjusting existing organisational and coordination routines are pivotal preconditions.
The pre-crisis period
In hindsight, we can see that during the years preceding the crisis, the EU was almost giving up -due to lax enforcement -on its earlier agreements on fiscal policy coordination. In 2005 the EU revised the Stability and Growth Pact to provide more flexibility for interpreting the deficit and debt rules. As a result, fiscal governance became relatively flexible and countries could deploy their established fiscal policy approaches to finance (via deficit financing, or other means) their policies and strategies. (Hallerberg 2011) For CEE, the pre-crisis period overlapped with the accession to the EU (in 2004) and the obligation to work towards Eurozone accession. While in the 1990s CEE economic policies concentrated on macro-economic stabilisation, monetary, liberalisation, privatisation, taxation, and labour market policies with significant varieties in specific approaches (see Lane and Myant 2007) , by mid-2000s most of these policies became either integrated into common European approaches or (e.g. financial liberalisation policy), or lost their relative importance (e.g. privatisation was largely completed). This limited the scope of policy tools that could be employed for specific domestic development challenges. Thus, innovation policy in the broad sense (including industrial, R&D, educational policies both at the national and regional level) became one of the key policies through which the government could in theory try to differentiate economic policies and tackle their unique growth and development challenges.
At the same time, it became increasingly evident at the EU level that the expectations set on the Lisbon Agenda for supporting growth and competitiveness were not being fulfilled (Rodrigues 2009) . The flexible open method of coordination type mechanisms and high-technology biased innovation policy approaches led to convergence on policies supporting commercialisation, collaboration and networking between innovation system actors (Dosi et al. 2006 ). Yet, this has not been the main structural problem in CEE where developing basic public and private RDI capabilities should be a bigger concern (Karo and Kattel 2010; Izsak et al. 2014 ). This recognition resulted in the gradual search for alternative logics of competitiveness and innovation policies already in mid-2000s and in a growing emphasis on more targeted and customised policy mixes (see EC 2004; 2005) .
Responses to the Great Recession
The Great Recession brought about a policy shift in the fiscal policy coordination in the EU (see Bickerton et al. 2014; Hallerberg 2011; Verdun 2015) . After a short period of fiscal stimulus, the EU and especially Eurozone shifted to austerity as the key policy response (see Mody 2015) . Institutionally, this shift started with the initiation of the European Semester as a coordination mechanism in 2010. It was through more experimental and co-productive approach to policy making that bridges policy makers with academic and private sector actors to search for novel and country/region specific economic specialisations and draft relevant strategies and experimental policy instruments (Foray 2014; McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2015) .
These parallel shifts in policy focuses and coordination practices have also brought about institutional readjustments of fiscal and economic and RDI policy governance.
At the EU level, the content and direction of its RDI policies has become the domain of not only Directorate General (DG) for Research and Innovation but is also influenced by DG for Regional and Urban Policy (DG Region). In addition, the European Semester has extended the monitoring and coordination of fiscal and economic policies (by the Secretariat General and DG for Economic and Financial Affairs) to cover RDI policies as they influence competitiveness, employment and functioning of the EMU (Savage and Verdun 2016) . At the national level, ministries of finance and cabinet offices have become more involved in RDI policies though more centralised budgetary processes (see Raudla et al. 2015) and also through ESIF Partnership Agreement negotiations and the European Semester monitoring system.
In sum, the EU seeks to increasingly coordinate fiscal, RDI and other economic policies through different instruments from European Semester monitoring, Excessive Deficit Procedure and Country Specific Recommendations to smart specialisation conditionality monitoring and policy learning initiatives (see the smart specialisation platform 1 ). Yet, Veugelers (2014, pp. 7-9) has claimed that at least early Country Specific Recommendations (CSR) on RDI policies were as 'patchy' and 'ad hoc' as during the Lisbon Agenda period. Furthermore, the specific rationales of novel RDI polices from societal challenges to smart specialisation are only emergent and lack coherent operationalisation (see Foray et al. 2011; Karo and Kattel 2015; Karo and Lember 2016) . While fiscal rules are relatively fixed and straightforward in the EU fiscal and economic policy coordination system and understandable to most policy actors (Savage and Verdun 2016) , the content of RDI related policy recommendations and rules (ESIF conditionalities) is more ambiguous in the current EU policy coordination context and depends on the capabilities of both the EU and member state level bureaucracies. While the experiences of more developed regions with new RDI concepts such as smart specialisation seem relatively positive, the CEE economies seem to face their particular challenges (see Kroll 2015) .
The Great Recession and policy responses in CEE

Capitalist varieties and convergence in CEE
CEE economies are often treated as a homogeneous group (especially the eight countries that joined the EU in 2004), but detailed within-group comparisons have often emphasised their differences. Bohle and Greskovits (2012) distinguish between the neoliberal Baltic States, the embedded neoliberal Visegrad and the neocorporatist Slovenia. These categories reflect not only dominant ideological positions but characterise also the forms of state-market-society relations, from the dominance of free market imperative in the neoliberal countries towards more embedded tri-partite relationships in other countries. Myant and Drahokoupil (2012) argue that the political-economy explanations of the CEE developments -especially after the Great Recession -should also take into account the varieties in the modes of international economic integration. These CEE economies can be divided into exporters of complex manufacturing goods (historically more West-integrated and FDI-driven
Visegrad countries and less FDI-driven Slovenia) and financialised economies (historically more peripheral and technologically lagging Baltic States). These modes of integration have also been mirrored by different economic policy approaches: from less interventionist macro-economic and innovation policies in the Baltic States to gradually more active industrial and FDI policies in the embedded neoliberal and neocorporatist economies.
These categorisations are also quite well supported by data on economic performance in terms of knowledge-based or innovation-related competitiveness. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of knowledge intensity (measured as charges for the use of IP rights) and industrial productivity (value added per capita) in selected regions and economies.
Plotting these two measures should illustrate a virtual development 'ladder', or trajectory: as economies get more knowledge intensive (measured here by the charges on IP rights 2 ), we expect them to also exhibit higher industrial productivity.
--Insert Figure 1 about here -
2 We are aware that this is an imperfect measure as it measures mostly the use of codified knowledge while especially transition economies may be more reliant and specialised into tacit knowledge use and production; but the latter is close to impossible to capture by similar indicators.
The Baltic States, Slovenia and Visegrad seem to form three different patterns. While for most CEE economies, the vicinity to the core European exporting economies (Scandinavia and Germany respectively) has gradually brought about increasingly complex production (especially in Visegrad countries where a lot of the growth in knowledge intensity has taken place in Hungary and Czech Republic to where multinational companies have relocated (or maintained) their local production enclaves, e.g. Drahokoupil et al., 2016 ). Yet, this has not in all cases been reflected in increasing productivity.
In addition, Bohle and Greskovits (2012) have noted (see also Stanojevic 2014) that both Slovenia and the Visegrad countries have been pressured to converge towards the neoliberal end of the spectrum by Europeanisation, financialisation and responses to the Great Recession. In addition, several studies of innovation and RDI policies (Török 2007; Karo and Kattel 2010; Suurna and Kattel 2010; also Izsak et al. 2014 ) have argued that after the differences in crisis management approaches in the early 1990s, by mid-2000s all CEE economies were converging on rather similar horisontal innovation policy approaches with limited attempts by the state to steer the direction of economic development.
The nature of the Great Recession in CEE
These differences in the financial and economic integration patters affected how the Great Recession unfolded in different CEE economies. Myant et al. (2013, pp. 385;  see also Figure 2 ) have depicted the emergence and the evolution of the crisis through the following steps:
First came a sharp halt to credits that affected most severely those countries that had been dependent on financialised growth, but also led to increased caution from banks in all countries. Next came a fall in demand for exports from those countries exporting products that were sold with the help of credits, meaning motor vehicles and other high-value consumer goods. The reductions in incomes through lower profits and wage payments led to a further reduction in domestic demand and to lower tax revenues and this, in combination with any additional spending undertaken in the context of the crisis, led to deepening state-budget deficits. 
Fiscal policy responses
The concrete responses to the crisis and the roads towards the EU austerity-driven strategy has been strongly determined by the political 'costs' of different strategies (Walter 2016) . Over the course of the Great Recession, most countries have shifted towards fiscal consolidation with a growing emphasis on expenditure reductions (see Table 1 ). While in Estonia, this was politically and socially a rather easy and costless process (Raudla and Kattel 2011) , in other countries political turmoil and social protests were much more frequent and influenced the speed and direction of the crisis responses.
---Insert Table 1 In sum, despite their historical and economic differences and also differentiated acceptance of the EU fiscal and economic policy monitoring and coordination mechanisms, all countries seem to have gradually and in most cases reluctantly accepted the austerity-based fiscal policy coordination approach of the EU. This trend has been paralleled by relatively significant role of EU fiscal transfers in domestic budgets and economy as a whole (see Figure 3 ).
---Insert Figure 3 about here ---
Coordination of RDI policies since the Great Recession
The Great Recession has also impacted RDI investments across the EU and overall RDI investments (GERD) are pressured by both declining private and public investments (Veugelers 2014) . In CEE, especially in the harder hit Estonia and Slovenia, GERD and government financed GERD have fallen since 2011 (see Figure   4 ). This somewhat delayed decline of government investments is at least partly the result of the strategy to transfer RDI funding to ESIF (and front-loading the use of these funds), which were ending in 2013 (see Figure 3) .
During the early years of the crisis, Estonia chose to front-load economic restructuring oriented cohesion funding investments (from support to businesses and universities to active labour market policies) to re-balance cost-cutting activities Srholec (2013) 14% of GBAORD, in Czech Republic about 5% and in Poland about 6%. We see this trend continuing also during the 2014-2020 period (see Table 2 ) as the role of RDIrelated funding is schedule to proportionally increase in the ESIF in Estonia, Slovenia and especially in Poland where government plans to significantly increased RDI related ESIF allocations to lift GERD from current level of 0.9% of GDP up to 1,7%
by 2020 (EC 2014b). Table 2 about here ---In this context, both the growing focus on societal challenges in Horizon 2020 and on smart specialisation in cohesion policy can be treated as attempts by the EU to steer national and regional innovation systems towards higher impact RDI activities.
---Insert
Successful implementation of especially smart specialisation based policy approach depends on how member state level and regional actors accept these concepts and transform these into policies and strategies. As mentioned, we conjecture that given the uncertainties related to these new and more experimental RDI policy rationales and only emerging EU level policy capacities to operationalise and coordinate these approaches, the more straightforward austerity driven fiscal consolidation rules and existing RDI policy and administrative routines of member states continue to drive policy processes and limit policy space for such experimental RDI policy making. In the following discussion we will concentrate on smart specialisation as it has had more direct impact on the foci of CEE RDI policies given its ex ante conditionality status in ESIF. repeatedly emphasised the need to focus public RDI support on limited number of smart specialisation areas (similar recommendations were given also to Slovenia in 2014; in the case of Poland and Czech Republic, the focus of CSR has been on more basic issues of RDI system building, e.g. fostering university-industry collaboration, improving funding and evaluation systems). 7 At the same time, the Estonian policy makers have not taken these recommendations very seriously and made only minor adjustments in the RDI policy mix. Some policy makers believed that the CSRs mentioned smart specialisation concerns only because Estonian fiscal and economic policies were in a much better state than in other countries and the EC had to add something to have some more 'content' in the document.
In larger CEE economies, these centralisation tendencies are counter-balanced by the need to development also regional smart specialisation strategies (14 in Czech
Republic and 16 in Poland). Yet, this has created another hurdle in drafting more experimental and contextualized RDI policies. Most CEE economies have traditionally designed and implemented RDI policies on the national level and regional capacities and experiences have been limited. As a result, smart specialisation strategies and policies are considered to be of rather unequal quality between regions even within the same member state. Regions where policy makers have had prior experiences with RDI and interactions with businesses and academia seem to have been better equipped for drafting such strategies. These experiences raise questions whether such smart specialisation conditionality type universal coordination are in fact economically logical and politically feasible across diverse EU member states and regions with diverse politico-economic structures and policy and administrative capabilities (see Karo and Kattel 2015) . In sum, the EU has sought to nudge -through the smart specialisation conditionality and in some cases also explicitly through the European Semester based fiscal and economic policy coordination -member states to change their RDI policies and adopt the novel EU proposed RDI policy models as part of growth-enhancing strategies across the EU. Yet, three critical issues have reduced the expected outcomes of this process. First, the concept of smart specialisation itself is vaguely defined and needs to be first properly conceptualised and coordinated within the EU. While DG for
Research and Innovation has developed generic and sectoral RDI policy focuses and organisational capabilities and DG Regio has followed more country-specific focuses, regionally focused and experimental RDI policy is a relatively new and emerging topic for both of them. Thus, second, despite the extended attempts for more centralised coordination of fiscal and RDI policies through the European Semester and related instruments, the EU has also not been able to provide sufficient vision and guidelines for CEE economies on how to change existing policy and administrative routines given both the conflicting expectations of the growth enhancing strategy (to pursue austerity while maintaining/increasing RDI investments) and local pressures for fast utilisation of ESIF funds. Third, the same capability challenges seem to emerge on the member state level as well, especially as most CEE member states have traditionally emulated European 'best practices', which seem to be currently missing.
Thus, neither regions nor traditional RDI policy actors and also ministries of finance and cabinet offices seem to encompass visions and capabilities for more experimental RDI policy-making. The EU has sought to improve the capabilities of member and regions through its Smart Specialisation Platform and mutual policy learning exercises, but these activities have focused on the conceptual ideas of smart specialisation and on how to set priorities, rather than on how to design institutional contexts and instruments for more experimental and contextual RDI policies.
Conclusion
The austerity-driven fiscal consolidation approach adopted by the EU has reduced the policy space for economic restructuring policies. In addition to lacking or limited monetary policy, also fiscal policy space is becoming increasingly constrained and with a shorter-term focus. Analysed CEE case studies indicate that this seems to be increasingly the case even in the Central European countries such as Czech Republic and Poland where prior traditions have favoured close forms of state-society coordination (stronger welfare state policies), state-market coordination (industryspecific industrial and innovation policies) and where the Great Recession has had relatively limited impact. Given this austerity-driven exit strategy, cohesion policy and ESIF have remained as the few sources through which CEE economies can finance new growth oriented RDI strategies and policies. At the same time, the EU is shifting its RDI policies towards shorter-term impact oriented activities: both Horizon 2020 and ESIF focus increasingly on application oriented research as opposed to more basic RDI and capabilities building. This may have unintended long-term negative implications for growth enhancing economic policy coordination as the focus on basic RDI capabilities building -the main RDI challenges for most CEE economies -may become less and less important. In other words, the issues we have raised regarding the feasibility of coordinating fiscal consolidation and growth oriented RDI policies in CEE are a combined outcome of the EU level search better and novel RDI policy concepts and exit strategies from the Great Recession as well as the CEE responses to the policy constraints and uncertainties created by these search processes.
In contrast to fully federalist systems, the EU's fiscal and economic policy mixes are inherently unstable because they do not allow for significant fiscal transfers (via automatic stabilisers of welfare systems) and movement of labour in order to offset slumps in demand. In addition, these policy mixes are based on rather complex intergovernmental compromises, which makes actual policy coordination between different EU actors (Directorate Generals of the Commission) and between EU and member state policy actors as complicated as generating the initial compromises. This environment seems to strengthen external constraints on domestic politics and policymaking and simultaneously increase instabilities especially in more corporatist and embedded political systems.
Thus, the EU needs not only to decide upon its further path of federalisation (or not).
But regardless of the former choices, if the EU seeks to improve the coordination of fiscal and growth oriented economic policies, it needs to build in its institutions, and policy approaches, especially regarding ESIF, flexibilities and policy capacities that allow for more context-fitting policy choices and experimental policy approaches considering the different politico-economic legacies and traditions of policy making and coordination in CEE. The current EU's intergovernmentalist integration patterns seem to create policy compromises, conditionalities and coordination practices that are too complex for providing such guidelines in a coherent manner. Our analysis confirms the earlier claims by Veugelers (2014) 
